Résumé :
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Forest, irrigation systems, fisheries, groundwater basins, grazing lands, and the air we breath are all examples of common-pool resources (CPRs). Because no one has property rights or control over such a resource, users of CPRs are frequently assumed to be caught in an inescapable dilemma -overexploitation of the ressource, or what is commonly known as "the tragedy of the commons" -.Using the analytic tools of game theory and institutional analysis and an empirical foundation based on controlled laboratory experiments and field data, this book explores endogenous institutional development. Specifically, this research focuses on three questions. On CPR dilemmas, to what degree are the predictions about behavior and outcomes derived from noncooperative game theory supported by empirical evidence ? Where behavior and outcomes are substantially different from the predicted, are there behavioral regularities that can be drawn upon in the development of improved theories ? What types of institutional and physical variables affect the likelihood of successful resolution of CPR dilemmas ?
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