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Titre :
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Long-run equilibria in the monetary policy game
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Auteurs :
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A. D'artigues ;
T. Vignolo ;
LABORATOIRE MONTPELLIERAIN D'ECONOMIE THEORIQUE ET APPLIQUEE
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Type de document :
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rapport
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Année de publication :
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2002
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Format :
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13 p. + ann.
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Note générale :
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Sigle : LAMETA
Diffusion tous publics
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Langues:
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= Anglais
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Catégories :
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Methodologie
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Mots-clés:
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ECONOMIE
;
EQUILIBRE MONAITAIRE
;
THEORIE DU JEU
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Résumé :
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The present paper represents an attempt to explain at once the inflationary bias and the convergence to low inflation rates in the monetary policy game, without resorting to the "conservative" solution or other institutional arrangements. It is necessary to leave the monetary independence issue by arguing that countries have followed a convergence process with a form of loose coordination of monetary policy.
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