Titre :
|
Governing the commons:the evolution of institutions for collective action
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Auteurs :
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E. Ostrom ;
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
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Type de document :
|
ouvrage
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Editeur :
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Cambridge [GBR] : *** Cambridge University Press, 1990
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Collection :
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Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
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ISBN/ISSN/EAN :
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0 521 40599 8
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Format :
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280 p.
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Langues:
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= Anglais
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Catégories :
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Economie - droit - gestion
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Mots-clés:
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RESSOURCE NATURELLE
;
POLITIQUE
;
GESTION
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Résumé :
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The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market has been uniformly successful in solving common-pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore the conditions under which common-pool resource problems have been unsatisfactorily solved. Dr. Orstom first describes thre models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity ofpossible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways- both successful and unsuccessful- of governing the commons. In contrast to the propositions of the "tragedy of the commons" argument, common-pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forest, irrigation communities and water rights, and fisheries.
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